Scholars are sometimes prone to assume that historic record is a source for optimum decisions today. And once policy makers have adapted it to present-day circumstances, many acute problems presumably would arise no longer. Thus, according to some scholars, the free trade system practiced between the medieval Hanseatic League and Russia could serve to some extent as a pattern for trade and economic relations between Russia and the European Union today. In all likelihood, this view is insufficiently substantiated from the perspective of both history and an adequate interpretation of the differences between Russia and EU.
A retrospective analysis of the Russian-Hanseatic ties in the XIV-XVII centuries indicates that the status of free trade between the two parties to economic relations was far from idyllic, as one tends to picture them today. We can go as far as saying that most systemic problems typical of the present-day relationship between Russia and the European Union took their shape back then and tangled both political and economic ties between the Hansa and Russia.
Primarily, we should point out highly politicized nature of the Russian-Hanseatic trade. Civilizational, religious and cultural differences existed even then; trade between the trading parties bore an indelible imprint of the discrepancies in their strategic and geopolitical interests.
Indeed, the Russian-Hanseatic trade was a significant and mutually beneficial economic factor of the Northern European development. But the analysis of its later-day historiography, however, shows that the West and East had different perceptions of benefit. German researchers, specifically, G. Sartorius, the most prominent among them and the founder of Hanseatic historiography (XVIII century), overrated the effect of the Hanseatic trade on Russia's economic progress. a
In their turn, Russian researchers rejected the German claims to the messiatic nature of trade. In the mid-XIX century Russian scholar M. Berezhkov wrote, "We are far from entertaining the idea that the Hansa merchants played some special role of the bearers of a superior culture through whom the door to the European civilization allegedly opened for Novgorod." b Recognizing the fact that "the Hanseatic trade stirred up lively industrial movement across the Novgorod land", Berezhkov maintains, however, that "the Hanse reaped great benefits from the trade with Novgorod and owned to the fact." c
Clearly, the debate as to who was a greater beneficiary of the Russian-Western economic links did not spring up only yesterday or today. It has been ongoing for a long time fruitlessly.
From our perspective, fundamental to the issue is the proposition that the times of the Russian-Hanseatic trade saw the shaping of the disproportionate export-import structure largely characteristic of the present-day relations between Russia and Western Europe. Leaving itemization of goods aside, the overall conclusion is as follows: Russia supplied the West with largely unprocessed raw materials, whereas finished products prevailed in the Hanseatic exports to Russia. Fur-skins, most of which were cheap uncured pelts, primarily squirrel, were top priority items in the Russian exports. Finished goods were virtually non-existent. The Hansa merchants encouraged this situation and even sought to secure it contractually (the Contract of 1376). Wax came second in the value of Russian exports to the Hansa, while hides came third.
In contrast to Russia, the Hanseatic League exported primarily finished goods, not crude materials. Textiles, mostly high-quality cloth, were the Hansa's largest export items to Russia. In addition, the Hanseatic League shipped silver bullion and coins. Guns, elite foodstuffs (wines, beer, and herring) were also among the imported items from the Hansa. Large shipments of salt somewhat distort the picture, but they were delivered owing to a specific situation in Northern Russia. Significantly, in the late XV-early XVI centuries Russia initiated prohibitions for salt deliveries from the Hansa to protect domestic producers.
The issue of a political mistrust in trade looks highly topical both then and now. Right on the heels of the Hanseatic League formation in the early XIV century (the term German Hansa is believed to be coined by the English King Edward II in 1315), d Hansa founded a branch in Novgorod dubbed St. Peter's German Yard (1346). That organization was the conduit of all Hansa-Russian trade for one and a half centuries. It also regulated the trade and established stiff rules. Analysis of these rules indicates that Germans did not trust Novgorod merchants and feared deception and fraud. They were forbidden to go out and trade with Russians alone and were recommended to take along a companion - but not a brother, or partner, or servant - because in the event of litigation with Russians the court would not treat them as reliable witnesses. After making the bargain a German trader was not to settle the account then and there but make payments only after the goods were delivered to the German Yard. Come darkness, all trade with Russians at the court came to a standstill by a special sign, and the yard was locked up. e
Protection of property rights, to use the present-day terminology, was especially topical at the time. Theft, robbery, plunder and murder of merchants were rampant on the Hansa-Russian trade space. Also, numerous wars waged at the time seriously hurt the trade. The conflict of Russian and Hanseatic interests that arose as the result brought about total cessation of trade (1467,1471). The loss of Novgorod's independence in 1478 following Moscow's expansion dealt a heavy blow to the Hansa-Russian trade. And in 1494 the Novgorod German Court was devastated by Moscow's Grand Prince's decision and never recovered to its former dimension.
Political troubles between Russia and the German states had a direct bearing on the freedom of trade. Russia's influential enemies insisted on banning exports of certain goods, primarily, of military designation, to Russia. In 1506 Master of the Teutonic Order wrote to Lubeck merchants calling them to forgo selling metals to Russia: the metals to a certain extent can be used for production of arms, to be used by Russians and enemies against the Christians and the lands (Livonia). f
It may be important that the Hanseans were mainly opposed to the prohibitions. It was in their interest to provide Russians with what they needed and accordingly gave profit. g
Growth of a centralized absolutist Russian State affected the political freedom within the country and the freedom of trade internationally. Tariffs came to be introduced gradually. In late XVI- early XVII centuries Moscow still granted Lubeck certain privileges but rejected the Hansa as a whole. Besides, the latter was well on the decline at the time.
After analyzing large amounts of statistical and historiography material Russian researchers are critical about the way free trade functioned in the Hanseatic-Russian relations in the Middle Ages. Specifically, they note that:
Economic processes of integration in Western Europe including a move toward free trade that started to take shape in the post-war years were read as a threat by the communist leadership of the Soviet Union. An objective nature of these processes was emphatically denied. The Soviet totalitarianism denounced economic freedom in all its forms, including free trade. It branded Western European integration as "capitalist intrigues", "monopolist drive to achieve a steady increase of superprofits and solidify its rule." i But all this verbal chaff was designed to hide the fears concerning the integration's military aspects, that is, reinforcement of the European component in the West's general defense.
Admittedly, the chief line of attack engineered by the Soviet leaders and propaganda gurus was targeted at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) viewed as the USSR's archenemy. However, European integration associations, primarily the European Economic Community, also got the flak. The Soviet Union treated them as NATO's appendage. The Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary wrote in the early 1980s, "The European Economic Community is closely linked to NATO and has been designed as a base to achieve military and political consolidation of Western European capitalist nations and is trained on socialist states". j Significantly, a political standoff against European integration had a bearing on historiography approaches to trade ties with the medieval Hansa. During the most acute Cold War confrontation of the 1950s Soviet researchers, in an attempt to bridge a gulf between the present and the past sought grounds for Russia's enmity toward the Hanseatic League. According to Eric Tiberg with reference to K. Bazilevich, "earlier research has regarded Moscow's attitude toward the Hanse as inimical and aimed at destroying the League's superiority in trade." k
Gradually, with the detente processes picking up, the Soviet attitudes to the European integration underwent some change. Curiously, this did not fail to reflect on the Russia-Hansa historiography coverage. St. Petersburg researcher N. Kazakova, in a semblance of polemic with Bazilevich, "argued in the mid-1970s that Moscow only wanted to compel Livonia and the Hanse to give the subjects of the Grand Prince better conditions in trade. There was no wish to destroy it." l
At long last, by the mid-1970s Moscow largely recognized the objective nature of Western European economic integration. A dramatic role in convincing the Kremlin leaders of its inevitability belonged to the liberal (by Soviet standards) scholars and economists who were the Kremlin insiders. Among them I would name first and foremost Academician Nikolai Inozemtsev, then Director of the World Economy and International Relations Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The research team he headed arrived at the conclusion that "a tendency to international economic integration is an objective factor ultimately linked to the present-day level of the productive forces and to the ongoing scientific and technical revolution in the world at large." m This finding had a huge political bearing on further Soviet-EEC ties.
At the same time, this partial recognition of West European integration's economic realities did nothing to alleviate Moscow's fears and even enmity toward the political and military aspects of the integration. At best, they were ignored, at worst, were passed for the new intrigues staged by "the aggressive forces of imperialism." In the late 1970s I took interest in political integration within EEC, namely, in tendencies of elaborating the Community's common foreign policy that were revealed in the course of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Middle East crisis settlement. And I decided to write a Ph.D. dissertation on the subject. But my mentor, a distinguished expert in international relations, rejected it then and there claiming the subject of research was non-existent.
Much water has flowed under the bridge since then, but the Russian political elite continues to mistrust Western Europe's foreign and defense policies. Russia expressed certain concerns in conjunction with the defense and security dimension in EU activities known as European Security and Defense Identity. Russia is somewhat suspicious of its nature and purposes. "Who is this initiative directed against?" - Russian politicians tend to ask. Small wonder, the Russian foreign policy concept maintained that "special attention should be given to establishing EU military-political dimension" in the EU-Russian dialogue." n
Admittedly, with the Cold War mindset gradually overpowered, confrontational prejudices of Russia vis-a-vis EU are being relegated to the background, whereas economic factors move up the agenda, which opens up broad opportunities for further cooperation. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that Russia and EU signed in 1997 has become a major milestone in this respect. This Agreement defines Russia and EU as strategic partners and lays the groundwork for bilateral political and economic relationship. But its implementation proceeds by bumps and bruises, largely owing to enduring fundamental economic, political and other differences between Russia and the EU member states.
From my perspective, the most serious hurdle is that Russia significantly lags behind the EU nations, including the new entrants, in the degree of economic freedom annually measured by the Heritage Foundation in a corresponding Index. If Poland - the "worst" of the EU novices - ranks 54th, Russia only comes 114th. o Such a huge gap clearly hampers Russia's convergence with EU.
The present day sees a host of unsettled issues between Russia and EU, which in their totality give grounds to speculations that there are beginnings of a crisis. In a recent Wall Street Journal article jointly written by Foreign Ministers Wlodzimierz Cimoszewiez (Poland) and Per Stig Meller (Denmark) they shared their concern over an unsatisfactory situation in the EU-Russia relationship that would require special efforts to combat. p
What are the problems? Roughly they could be broken in two groups - the EU's claims to Russia and Russia's claims to the EU. The European Union's major grudges to Russia are as follows.
What Russia expects from EU? Its grudges are as follows:
The list of mutual claims does not end here. But what I have already itemized gives weighty ground for concluding that the EU-Russia convergence toward a free trade and integration is proceeding the hard way. A strategic dialogue agreed by the parties back in 1999 brought about no dramatic breakthrough. In addition, new negative aspects keep piling up, new knots are getting tied hindering the development of mutual trust and exacerbating estrangement.
If in the early-mid 1990s Russian society was largely euphoric over the European Union entertaining illusions of Russia's fast-track integration in a civilized community, today disenchantment reigns supreme. Everybody realizes only too well that the European Union is hardly anxious either to have Russia as a full-fledged member, or its citizens, even as tourists. Moscow prefers to stay clear of Brussels but would rather build up relationships with the leading EU members on a bilateral basis and seek its ends through them. Under the circumstances, imperialist ambitions that prevail in the Russian elite prevent them from perceiving the EU's new entrants as equal partners.
Where does the present situation stem from? To speak about a confrontation of two protectionisms - Russian and European, - of subversion practiced by both Moscow and Brussels bureaucracies is the easiest tack. Admittedly, all these exist and do little to help convergence. From my perspective, however, the causes of the present crisis are much more deep-rooted and bear the imprint of the many layers of suspicion and foreignness growing in the relationship between Russia and Western Europe for centuries.
In conjunction with this, it appears Russia and the EU should be interested in clearing up the present situation, working out their relationship, jointly figuring out the reasons for its emergence and agreeing on the ways to combat the existing difficulties. A retrospective analysis of the Russian-Hanseatic relationship could help arrive at some useful conclusions. International relations, so much more complicated today, envisage a broader approach encompassing a scope of political, economic, geo-strategic and cultural factors.
As a practical step toward this end, Moscow and Brussels could establish a special joint program to study the EU-Russian relationship. The program should be targeted at addressing the accumulated problems taking into account the accumulated historical experience and vital interests of both parties.